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KArolinA KoziurA
THE HiDDEn MinoriTY? DilEMMAS ArounD 
THE STATuS oF THE ruSSoPHonE uKrAiniAnS 
 in ConTEMPorArY uKrAinE
A b S T r A C T
Ukraine, as one of the states which became independent in 
1991, can be perceived as an example of the typical transition 
of Soviet Socialist Republics into democratic states centered 
on the issue of nationalizing policies and processes. However, 
there are also differences which make this country a very in-
teresting case study for investigation. Mainly, Russians here 
form the biggest national group concentrated in the East 
and South of the country. The persistence and reuse of the 
“myth of two Ukraines” led to the widespread conclusion that 
Ukraine is a country which is divided between Ukrainophone 
West and Russophone East. This article focuses on the third 
group, which is somehow hidden in the mainstream linguis-
tic debates, namely the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine 
who define themselves as ethnic Ukrainians. Based on the 
examples of Donbas and Crimean regions, it tries to define 
whether one can perceive them as a national minority. 
K e y  w o r d s: Ukraine; Russian minority; Ukrainophones and 
Russophones; linguistic debates; nationalizing states; “two 
Ukraines”
uKrYTA MniEjSzość? KonTrowErSjE woKół 
STATuSu uKrAińCów roSYjSKojęzYCznYCH 
wE wSPółCzESnEj uKrAiniE
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Ukraina, która uzyskała niepodległość w 1991 roku, jest przykła-
dem typowej dla regionu transformacji od Socjalistycznej Re-
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4publiki Radzieckiej do państwa demokratycznego zorientowanego narodowo. Jednym z największych 
wyzwań w budowie współczesnego narodu ukraińskiego są kwestie językowe skupione wokół statusu 
Rosjan, którzy stanowią tu największą mniejszość narodową skoncentrowaną głównie na wschodzie 
i południu kraju. Wiąże się to z powstaniem mitu o „dwóch Ukrainach” podzielonych pomiędzy ukra-
ińskojęzyczną ludność zamieszkującą zachód oraz rosyjskojęzyczną ludność dominującą na wschodzie 
kraju. Niniejszy artykuł omawia kontrowersje wokół statusu trzeciej grupy, pominiętej w tym stereoty-
powym obrazie państwa ukraińskiego, mianowicie Ukraińców rosyjskojęzycznych, i stawia za cel odpo-
wiedzieć na pytanie, jak dalece grupa ta może być zdefiniowana w kategoriach mniejszości. 
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: Ukraina; mniejszość rosyjska; problemy językowe; państwo zorientowane 
narodowo; „Dwie Ukrainy” 
inTroDuCTion
One of the most important political processes in Europe in the 1990s was the chal-lenge faced by Soviet Socialist Republics in transition from internal administra-tive borders to external international ones (Ratner, 1996). The new states which 
emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union faced not only the problem of interna-
tional recognition of their external borders but also the task of building coherent states 
and preventing further separatist movements according to ethnic lines within their bor-
ders (Ratner, 1996). Thus, for them, maintaining territorial integrity became one of the 
most important challenges in the first decade of the 1990s. Nationalism was obviously 
a tool for the successful state-building process and the question “who are we” became 
one of the most important ones for new Central and East European states. Thus, they 
became labeled as “nationalizing states”.1 However, nationalism was not only a conse-
quence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union but its primary cause, and it emerged from 
the decline of its institutional coherence (Beissinger, 2002). 
Ukraine, as one of the states which became independent in 1991, can, to some ex-
tent, be perceived as an example of the typical transition of a Soviet Socialist Republic 
into a democratic state. The first few years were dominated by national questions: on 
the one hand defining who they are as a nation, and on the other who “the Other” was, 
which created the biggest threat (Kuzio, 2001). In Ukraine, two regions were perceived 
both by Western observers and internal politicians as the most likely to separate: the 
Donbas region (eastern part of Ukraine) and the Crimea (a peninsula on the Black sea). 
However, there are also differences, which make this country a very interesting case 
study for investigation. Mainly, Russians here formed the biggest national group in the 
USSR and they in 1991 were the biggest minority, described by some authors as the 
second nation (Besters-Dilger, 2009; Kuzio, 2000). Thus, the problem of Russians and 
Russian-speakers in Ukraine and their relations with Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers 
became central for debates around the problem of nationalism in Ukraine.2 
1 By “nationalizing goals” I refer to Brubaker’s idea of nationalizing states which appear after the dissolution 
of empires (for example Soviet Union or Yugoslavia) and are directed towards building a nation-state. The 
idea of nationalizing states points to the unfinished and ongoing nature of nationalist projects and processes. 
It is characterized by five motifs: the idea of the existence of the core nation, its claims to ownership of the 
state, the existence of a weak/titular nation and specific state’s action to strengthen its position and finally 
the number of remedial actions. See: Brubaker, 1996.
2 As for Juliane Besters-Dilger (2009), Ukraine unites all possible linguistic problems of former Soviet Eastern 
Europe. 
5According to Taras Kuzio, nationalism is the most misused term in the study of con-
temporary Ukraine (Kuzio, 2000). It is usually discussed in the context of linguistic de-
bates and in reference to the Ukrainian-speaking population, living in the West of the 
country, and the Russian-speaking population inhabiting the East. As Mykola Riabchuk 
points out, it is very hard to find any Western publication on Ukraine which does not 
stress the significance of the linguistic and cultural differences between particular regions 
in Ukraine based on its historical and political foundations (Riabchuk, 2005). Sociological 
polls, results of elections, politicians’ rhetoric and academic works seem to prove this 
idea. Thus, starting in the beginning of the 1990s up to now, Ukraine has been perceived 
as a country divided into two parts: nationalist West and pro-Russian East or even more 
strictly, Ukrainian speakers in the West and Russian speakers in the East. As for Cath-
erine Wanner, nationalizing efforts in Ukraine faced two potential obstacles, namely, the 
largest Russian diaspora of all the former Soviet republics and one-third to half of the citi-
zens were considered “russified” or “denationalized” (Wanner, 1998). 
In my article, I discuss the dilemmas of the status of Russian-speaking citizens of 
Ukraine, who define themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, a group which is somehow hid-
den in the mainstream of linguistic debates in Ukraine.3 In their case, the possible line 
of identification can be only through nationalist oriented Ukrainian-speakers on the one 
hand, and pro-Russian Russian-speakers on the other. In this context, my main research 
question is whether and to what extent Russian-speaking Ukrainians can be perceived as 
a minority in Ukraine.
The following work is divided into three parts. In the first I discuss the legal aspects 
of the functioning of both language usage and minorities in Ukraine. Thus, I start my in-
vestigation from the Law on Languages in the USSR, introduced by the Ukrainian So-
viet Socialist Republic in 1989, then the Citizenship Law from 1991, the Law on National 
Minorities from 1992 and the new language law from 2012. In this part as well I briefly 
discuss the emergence of the myth of the “two Ukraines”. In the second part of my pa-
per, I use sociological data on the usage of Ukrainian and Russian languages and follow 
national identities in order to show how complicated the people’s lines of identification 
are in contrast with the advocates of the “two Ukraines” claim. The analysis of sociologi-
cal polls helps also in understanding who Russian-speakers are in Ukraine and who they 
identify with. In the final part of my paper, I use two examples of regions in Ukraine, 
mainly the Donbas and the Crimea to show local specificities of Russian-speakers in 
Ukraine. I choose these regions as, for many scholars and politicians in the beginning of 
the 1990s, they were perceived as the biggest threat to Ukrainian state integrity.4 
linguiSTiC AnD ETHniC iSSuES in PoST-SoviET uKrAinE 
In October 1989, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic introduced the Law on Languag-
es in the USSR, according to which the Ukrainian language became recognized as the 
3 This article is partially based on my research conducted in the framework of a research grant given by the 
Polish National Science Centre, no 2012/07/N/HS3/04169 realized at the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University 
in Lublin. Poland.
4 The main parts of the following article were written prior to the events which happened in Ukraine in De-
cember 2013, known as the “Euromaidan revolution,” and later the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by 
Russian forces. Thus, I do not largely refer to any kind of data from this period (mostly because of the lack 
of professional, ideologically-free sources). However, I claim that the main findings of this paper are not 
changed and when it is possible I compare them to the “Euromaidan” case. 
6“state language.” In this sense it could be used in work places, administrations, organiza-
tions and so on (Riabchuk, 2005, p. 65). Moreover, every state clerk (no matter their insti-
tutional affiliation) was to know both languages: Ukrainian and Russian and, if not, he or 
she needed to express their willingness to learn Ukrainian in a concrete amount of time. 
According to the Law, every school should not only guarantee possibilities of learning 
both Ukrainian and Russian but even give priority to Ukrainian which should be used in all 
exams (Riabchuk, 2005, p. 65).
The Law was not as radical as it may sound. Although it broadened the possible usage 
of the Ukrainian language, it also guaranteed the status of Russian. As before, Russian-
speakers could still gain their education in Russian, communicate in this language in pub-
lic institutions and fulfill all the cultural, informational and social needs in this language 
(mainstream media, publishers, cinema, theaters and so on were in Russian). Moreover, 
the Law did not introduce any real penalties for disobeying it and give an approximately 
10-year period to learn Ukrainian (Riabchuk, 2005, p. 67). 
The one inconvenience for Russian-speakers, which this new Law brought, was the 
obligatory task for them to learn Ukrainian. However, the similarity of these two languag-
es means that almost all Russian-speakers at least passively know Ukrainian (and defi-
nitely nearly all Ukrainian-speakers know Russian). However, theoretically the Law gave 
the priority to not only Ukrainian but also any other national language used by the major-
ity of the population in a concrete region. In practice, it referred to the Eastern part of 
Ukraine, where especially in big cities the majority used Russian. Moreover, the major-
ity of mainstream magazines, journals and TV programs were in Russian, thus Ukrainian-
speakers noticed serious problems in fulfilling the cultural needs in their own language. 
The Law should be described as a form of “constitutional nationalism” in which mem-
bers of one ethnic group are legally privileged (Hayden, 1992).
Although it seemed like Russian was more in favor than Ukrainian in the last years 
of the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the situation changed after 
the Republic became independent. As was presented by many scholars, the early stage 
of Ukraine’s independence was centered not around the Russian-Ukrainian question, but 
the process of building the Ukrainian nation as such without reference to the ethnic origin 
of the new state’s citizens (Goshulak, 2003; Kuzio, 2000). However, as David D. Laitin 
(1998, p. 262) states, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the most shocking experi-
ence for Russian-speakers and they were a group who faced a radical crisis of identity. 
Before 1989, it was unusual to see any kind of public identification of Russians living in 
the Union Republics. They were (although very often privileged) the same “family” of na-
tions as the others. As for them, being a Russian simply referred to being Soviet. Starting 
from the 1990s, they occurred as living in new states which bore the name of its titular 
nation and as such they become a new national minority. Their “identity struggles” re-
ferred to questions: who they are? What will they become? Are they people in a diaspora 
or should they return to a homeland?5
From the perspective of nationalizing states, two laws introduced in Ukraine in its 
early stage of independence are the most important. The first was the Citizenship Law 
5 David D. Laitin (1998) conducted very interesting research in which he compared the situation of Russians 
in four post-Soviet countries, namely: Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine. As he shows the difficult bias 
situation of new Russian minority in these countries the best reflect ambivalent terms they are described, 
for example: “the unrooted”, “people without a country”, “foreigners”, “noncitizens”, “unwanted citizens” 
and finally compatriots and simply Soviets. 
7introduced on the 8th of October 1991.6 The Law was a kind of compromise between the 
Ukrainian nationalists claiming that citizenship should be granted just to ethnic Ukrainians 
and the pro-Russian politicians opting for dual citizenship (Kuzio, 2002). According to it, 
privileges were given to, on the one hand, ethnic Ukrainians and on the other to every-
body residing in Ukraine at that time, no matter ethnic, social, political, linguistic or racial 
origins. The only criteria required for citizenship was sufficient knowledge of Ukrainian. 
In this sense, neither the ethnic background nor the linguistic aspects defined Ukrainians 
but their civic belonging to the state.7 
The second important law implemented in Ukraine at that time was also a very liberal 
Law on National Minorities introduced in 1992.8 It granted equal political, social, econom-
ic and cultural rights to all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origins under one condition: 
their loyalty to the Ukrainian constitution, state sovereignty and territorial integrity (Kuzio, 
2002, p. 94). According to the Law, national minorities are defined as “groups of Ukrain-
ian citizens who are not Ukrainian by nationality and who manifest national conscious-
ness and community of interest within the group” (Kuzio, 2002, p. 94). Russians were 
defined within this category. The Law on National Minorities was based on “individual 
rights” in which individuals are treated equally regardless of their origins. An example of 
this is that in the Ukrainian passport, one could not find information on ethnicity (unlike 
in the Soviet passport). In this sense, the Ukrainian government wanted to create a civic 
state, in which civil society was more important than ethnicity. However, the group hid-
den in these discussions was Russian-speakers.9 These were people who, despite using 
Russian in their everyday talks, defined themselves primarily as Ukrainians. In the face of 
both laws, they were a group in between, which escaped the mainstream vision of being 
Ukrainian or Russian-speakers and following this identification.
The linguistic debates became highlighted again when, in September 2012, a new 
language law was introduced in Ukraine.10 According to it, in an oblast (main adminis-
trative unit) when around 10 per cent of the population speak a different language than 
Ukrainian, this language can reach the status of the second language in that area. Until 
now, only in the Eastern parts of Ukraine – mainly in Donbas and in Crimea, Russian has 
been introduced as a second language. In contrast, this status was not allowed to any 
other language widely used in multilingual regions in Ukraine (for example the case of 
Hungarians in the Transcarpathian region). Thus it is perceived that the law itself was 
directed only to Russian-speakers in Ukraine. Again, newspapers, journals, Internet blogs 
and so on were full of anti-Russian agitation, and the new law was perceived as first of all 
a threat to the status of Ukrainian. Especially, as in the context of the main usage of lan-
guages in the media, many “Ukrainophones” perceived themselves as a minority. 
  6 As Rogers Brubaker (1996) claims the questions of citizenship and nationhood were the core aspects of the 
definition of statehood and the nationalizing projects in the beginning of the 1990s.
  7 This kind of civic basis of the first Ukrainian citizenship law is a consequence of the shape of Soviet state, 
in which the national question was highly institutionalized. Although the republics “belonged” to particular 
nations, their actual power within it was limited. As Rogers Brubaker points: “Ethnocultural nation did not 
depend on the existence of national republics; but the national republics did depend on the existence of 
ethnocultural nation.” See Brubaker, 1996.
  8 Following Rogers Brubaker, I define the national minority in political dimension as a subjective precipitate 
shaped by the national scheme of social classification. See: Brubaker, 1996, p. 66. 
  9 As David D. Laitin (1998, p. 264) shows, “the Russian-speaking population” is a term basically invented in 
1989. In many sources it refers to persons, community but never to a nationality or people (narod). 
10 The ruling Party of Regions used an international document ratified by Ukraine, namely Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages. See: Kulyk, 2009, p. 22.
8THE MYTH oF THE “Two uKrAinES”11
As Katherine Verdery (1995) shows in the case of Romania, the main group responsi-
ble for the spread of nationalist claims is formed by intellectuals. In the case of Ukraine, 
the most powerful group was formed of oligarchs who, since Ukraine’s independence, 
have influenced mainstream policies.12 The problem of the relations between Ukrain-
ians and Russians in Ukraine started to be visible in the middle of the 1990s. Mostly 
as a consequence of the elites’ struggles for recognition, mainly two clans – one from 
Dnipropietrovs’k and a second from Donets’k, emerged. This became evident when Leo-
nid Kuchma won the presidential election against Leonid Kravchuk in 1994. The first one 
during his campaign promoted the image of Kravchuk as being a nationalist and in favor 
of Western globalization, in response Kravchuk created the picture of Kuchma as being 
pro-Russian. Kuchma was also the first politician who officially promised the introduction 
of Russian as a second language (Bilaniuk, 2005). In stressing this, journalists started to 
publish election result maps in which Ukraine was divided into two parts: Western – pro-
Kravchuk and Eastern – pro-Kuchma. However, in reality both represented similar policies 
in favor of their clans and groups of support. The creation of their image as being pro-na-
tionalist or pro-Russian was largely a myth from the beginning, and the result of the clans’ 
struggles for power (Riabchuk, 2005). From now on, the “language card” was frequently 
played by different political actors in Ukraine (Kulyk, 2009, p. 22).
 The similar case as between Kravchuk and Kuchma appeared between Viktor Yanu-
kovych and Viktor Yushchenko in 2002. The first, Viktor Yanukovych, was perceived as 
heir to Kuchma and declared the continuation of his policy. The second, Viktor Yush-
chenko, together with his political party “Our Ukraine” (nasha ukraijna), was the repre-
sentative of the national democrats. The appearance of the new political force lead by 
Viktor Yushchenko was perceived as a threat to the former communist who remained in 
power. Thus, they created a very unpleasant image of him in the media. He was accused 
of being nationalist and having relationships with fascists (although in fact he was from 
Eastern Ukraine). Public opinion was warned that his possible rule together with Yulia Ty-
moshenko would cause the nationalization of the industry and unemployment. 
The myth of the “two Ukraines” seemed to decline during the Orange Revolution. 
Although a description of the political situation in 2005 goes beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, for many Ukrainians it was perceived as the beginning of the new era of the united 
nation. Language was also not an issue during the revolution. However, one needs to 
take into consideration that the main body of the pro-Yuschenko electorate and Orange 
protesters was formed by the Ukrainophones of the West and center of the country (Ku-
lyk, 2009, p. 25). Although during the rule of the Orange government language questions 
were not in the center of politics, several steps were taken to promote the Ukrainian 
language.13
11 In this part of my article, I refer to the idea of “two Ukraines” shaped by political actors after the 1990s. 
However, one should take into consideration that Ukraine for many centuries used to be a divided country, 
mostly between Ukrainophone West and Russophone East. Thus, I do not refer to different historiographies 
and the current historical memories in different parts of Ukraine. In this regard see: Hrytsak, Portnov & Su-
sak, 2007.
12 At this point, Ukraine was typical for the region, an example in which in the process of formation of new 
entities, the central role was played by territorial-political elites while the marginal role was played by the 
ethnocultural nations. See: Brubaker, 1996, p. 61.
13 As Aneta Pavlenko (2008, p. 275) shows, one of the cosmetic changes introduced by the Orange govern-
ment was the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine that starting from 2008 all foreign-language 
movies, including Russian, shown in Ukraine should be translated into Ukrainian. 
9The myth of the “two Ukraines” found fertile ground in Ukraine and was accepted by 
the majority of the population. It was constructed and confirmed by politicians, scholars, 
intellectuals and journalists and in this shape entered the public consciousness of Ukrain-
ian citizens. It was also visible after the events in Ukraine in the beginning of 2014. Dur-
ing that time, especially in the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, anti-Ukrainophone 
propaganda was spread. In this regard, the so-called “Euromaidan” revolution was con-
nected with fascist and nationalist activity of Ukrainophones. As a response, the city of 
Lviv mobilized an effort called “Lviv speaks Russian”, in which “Euromaidan” activists 
encouraged citizens to speak in Russian in order to show their support towards Russian-
speakers.
ProblEMS wiTH ESTiMATES
According to the first Ukrainian census of 2001, in comparison to the last census in the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic from 1989, the number of ethnic Ukrainians rose (from 
72.7% in 1989 to 77.8% in 2001) mostly because the number of ethnic Russians de-
clined (from 22.1% in 1989 to 17.3% in 2001). The number of other nationalities did not 
change much (from 5.1% in 1989 to 4.9% in 2001). During the census, it became evi-
dent that 85.2% of ethnic Ukrainians (66.3% of the total population) declared Ukrainian as 
their mother tongue and 14.8% of them (11.5% of the total population) declared Russian. 
Among ethnic Russians almost all declared Russian as their mother tongue (96%). To 
sum up, the census showed that 67% of Ukrainians perceive Ukrainian as their mother 
tongue and 29.6% Russian.14
Fig. 1. Percentage of the population who declared Russian as their native tongue by region15
However, everyone who has the possibility to stay in Ukraine for a given amount of 
time notices that neither ethnicity nor language play a significant role in the everyday 
life of its citizens. People usually freely communicate in both languages, even when for 
some reason they do not want to use a particular language.16 Moreover, the census re-
14 All data from http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/ukr/notice/news.php (“All-Ukrainian population census”, n.d.).
15 Source: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua (“All Ukrainian population census 2001”, n.d.).
16 On the blurred and permeable lines between using Ukrainian and Russian in the everyday context, see: 
Bilaniuk, 2005.
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vealed the problem of “mother tongue,” which seems not to be the measurement of 
using a particular language (for example in the big cities people prefer to use Russian, 
or rather surzyk—a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian). Thus, sociologists decided to in-
troduce the term “language of everyday use” rather than “mother tongue” in order to 
describe the linguistic preferences of Ukrainian citizens. According to these surveys, it 
showed that only 40-45% of ethnic Ukrainians preferred to use Ukrainian in their every-
day communication and 20-22% preferred Russian. Research showed that around 60% 
of Ukrainians can freely communicate in Russian, and 33% of Russians in Ukrainian.17
Thus, the citizens of Ukraine can be divided into four categories: Ukrainians using one 
language (20%), Ukrainians who are bilingual (52%), Russians using one language (14%) 
and Russians who are bilingual (8%). Consequently, it reveals that the citizens of Ukraine 
cannot be simply divided as many expect into a Ukrainian majority and Russian minority. 
Thus, to stress the linguistic specificity, sociologists proposed two new terms: “Ukrain-
ophones” and “Russophones” to stress language preferences (Riabchuk, 2005, p. 39). 
However, the idea of conceptualizing Ukrainian society according to linguistic, cultural, 
regional lines has several disadvantages. First of all, it ignores the existence of the third 
group—people who use both Russian and Ukrainian in everyday life, or who despite using 
Russian, declare themselves as Ukrainian. Those people are usually characterized as hav-
ing double identification which is rather weak and unstable (visible in the sentence: “I am 
not sure who I am”). Secondly, it seems like the role of language was highly exaggerated 
as an important factor for identification (visible in the debates around using the “mother 
tongue” or the “language of everyday usage” in surveys). Finally, the investigation of 
public opinion in 1998 showed that only 3.9% of respondents agreed that the Ukrainian 
language was an important factor in determining Ukrainian identity (Wilson, 2002). How-
ever, this does not mean that Ukrainian is not at all important. It is more a sign that other 
aspects, such as common history, ancestors or citizenship are more significant.
THE CASE oF DonbAS AnD CriMEA
The early stage of Ukraine’s independence showed that there was a strong support for its 
territorial integrity (Kuzio, 2000). In the declarations of both presidents, Leonid Kravchuk 
and Leonid Kuchma, the main idea was to build a common sense of Ukrainian identity, no 
matter the ethnic and linguistic origin of the state’s citizens (Wanner, 1998). In many cases, 
central elites maintained the need to keep current borders. However, most of the outside 
observers, as well as many in Ukraine, assumed that the Russian-speakers in Ukraine are 
likely to be separatists. “In actual fact, only a small minority of Russians in eastern Ukraine 
regard Russia as their ‘homeland’” (Kuzio, 2002, p. 80). Thus, separatism in Ukraine was 
largely a myth. As statistical data show, no secessionist movements were possible, mostly 
because there was not an obvious line of ethnic or linguistic mobilization.18 
However, there were two regions where the Ukrainian national idea was the weakest 
(mostly because of the presence of ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers), namely the 
Donbas and the Crimea. In this part of the paper, my main question is the situation of 
Russians and Russian-speakers there and their lines of everyday identification. 
17 All data from http://ukrstat.gov.ua (“State Statistics Service of Ukraine”, n.d.). 
18 Moreover, as Brubaker points out, Russians outside of the Russia Federation were not institutionally orga-
nized and empowered and as such did not develop strong elites. See: Brubaker, 1996, p. 61.
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Fig. 2. The Donbas region19
Donbas is a region which lies on the Ukrainian and Russian borderland and it is 
well known for its heavy industry. 85% of the region lies in Ukraine in two oblasts of 
Donets’k and Luhans’k. Traditionally, Donbas was always a pro-Russian and later a pro-
Soviet region, mostly because of its high industrial development in these two periods. 
Many scholars perceived this region as typical for Eastern Ukraine. This assumption is as 
wrong as describing Galicia as typical for Western Ukraine (Kuzio, 2002). In contrast, in 
Ukraine each of the regions has its specificity and local peculiarity. Thus, instead of “two 
Ukraines” one can say that we face “many Ukraines” (Riabchuk, 2005). 
Most of the Russians who live in the Donbas have lived there for many generations. 
Thus, they do not perceive Russia as their ‘homeland’, they are more locals—and this 
is the most common line of their identification (Motyl, 1987). As the census from 2001 
showed, this group is largely in transition (the decline of ethnic Russians in favor of 
ethnic Ukrainians) and nowadays the number of people who are bilingual continues to 
increase—as Mark Beissinger points out, “the massive reimaginings of self character-
ized the Soviet Union in its final years” (Beissinger, 2002, p. 147). However, still there 
is a huge group whose members are not sure about their own national belonging. In the 
first years of Ukraine’s independence many of them were more likely to declare them-
selves as Russian mostly because it was a kind of natural prolonging of their Soviet iden-
tity (Kuzio, 2000). Ten years later, people understood that it was somehow better and 
more profitable to be Ukrainian (in a Ukrainian state) and thus “switched” their identity. 
In this sense, Russian speakers in the Donbas are neither anti-Ukrainian, nor anti-Russian. 
This kind of “schizophrenia” is typical not only for Ukraine but many post-Soviet states.20
However, the elites have a huge impact on people’s everyday identification and are 
perceived as the biggest actors in the raise of nationalism in transitional states (Snyder, 
2000). In the case of the Donbas, as was mentioned before, two clans played the most 
significant role: one from Donets’k and the second from Dnipropietrovs’k. Their struggle 
finished after the election in 1994 when Leonid Kuchma became president (and thus the 
second of the clans won). It was clear for these new elites that it was more profitable 
to organize themselves in Ukraine rather than in Russia. Moreover, there have been no 
institutional forms around which Donbasites could be mobilized as well as single leader 
19 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donets_Basin (“Donets Basin“, n.d.).
20  The main claim of the Russian government was the protection of Russians living in these regions of Ukraine. 
However, on the other side, throughout this period the majority of people living there express rather neutral 
or even ignorant attitudes towards these actions than were involved in any kind of political manifestations. 
(Riabchuk, 2005).
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to follow. Even in cultural aspects, people here did not develop any indigenous forms of 
customs or folk tradition which could be perceived as Russian. Moreover, the last ten-
dency of mass tourism of Eastern Ukrainians to the Western part of the country during 
Christmas and Easter Holidays shows that there is a further possibility of larger integra-
tion of this region into the rest of the country.
The Crimea region, in contrast to the Donbas, was always perceived as distinct and 
one which deserves special status (Kuzio, 2002, p. 86). In the beginning of the 1990s, 
it was clear that the region would gain autonomy—the only problem was whether it 
should be a Tatar autonomous republic or ethnic Russian. The region had its own in-
stitutions, political parties and even presidency around which there was a possibility of 
mobilization towards Russia. However, all the movements collapsed in the first years of 
Ukraine’s independence, mostly because of the centrist politics of the first two presi-
dents and governments stressing the territorial integrity of the state. The first steps to-
wards the integration of the Crimea towards the rest of the country came together with 
the force to put on all the pro-Russian parties there to reregister as Ukrainian ones; then 
the disintegration of the Crimean Russian bloc in 1994-1995 and the abolishing of the 
Crimean presidency as an institution in 1995 (Goshulak, 2003). Finally, Crimean elites 
gave up the idea of being a sovereign state with stronger ties with Russia in favor of 
being an autonomous district with its own local government (and own elections) inside 
Ukraine’s borders. The new district with the capital city in Sevastopol also received its 
own regional symbols and anthem.
Fig. 3. The Crimea21
The Crimea, which was given to the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic by the Soviet 
Union in 1954, is distinct not only in its policy but especially in its ethnic structure. Unlike 
other regions in Ukraine, the majority of the Crimean population settled in the region after 
1945. They were mostly military personnel with stronger ties to the Soviet Union. They 
were most likely to declare Russia as their homeland (Kuzio, 2002, p. 87). The indigenous 
settlers of Crimea—mainly Tatars, were forced by Stalin’s regime to move to the far east-
ern parts of the Soviet Union. Their return was possible during the first years of Ukraine’s 
independence. Nowadays, for many scholars, a Tatar revival is perceived in the region 
and it is mostly expressed in the rising number of mosques there. Ukrainians there repre-
sent a minority with widespread usage of Russian in everyday communication, and only 
1.7% of Crimean television and radio broadcasts only in Ukrainian (Kuzio, 2002, p. 88). 
21 Source: http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/5174218 (“Crimean Oblast”, n.d.).
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The Crimean landscape is also different from the rest of the country. The symbols of the 
Soviet Union, together with the widespread statues of Lenin, are still the most significant 
elements in the cityscapes.
ConCluSion
From the perspective of statistical data, lines and dependencies between language, iden-
tity and political preferences are not clearly defined and unambiguous. Nevertheless, they 
may serve for different political purposes and manipulation. Thus, in Ukraine, the myth of 
the “two Ukraines” grew in power, and linguistic issues from time to time have become 
a hot topic in the country. In most of the cases, it is highlighted before elections, political 
campaigns or by intellectuals, stressing that Ukraine should be divided. Moreover, the 
constant repetitions of differences between the Eastern and Western parts of the coun-
try in the press, radio and TV programs have consequences in people’s perception of 
their own country as being deeply divided. Thus, in Ukraine, the language question has 
a clear political dimension. From a Ukrainophone’s point of view, Russians and Russian-
speakers in the East of the country are perceived as the biggest threat to the Ukrainian 
nation (Kuzio, 2001). This complicated internal situation of Ukraine is fertile ground for 
different kinds of manipulations—as the events of early 2014 showed. Until now, as the 
presented cases of Donbas and Crimea has shown, their perceived threat to Ukrainian 
state integrity was rather a myth. Even in the mass protests of Russian-speakers in the 
East and South of the country in favor of Russia’s interference in Ukraine, at the moment 
it is hard to estimate whether it is a sign of a pro-Russia feeling of the Russophones or 
rather a kind of disappointment of the current shape of Ukrainian state, and its economic 
situation. Thus, protests may reflect more a kind of Soviet nostalgia than a demonstration 
of any kind of national attachments.
Nevertheless, “Russophone” Ukrainians are a group which suffers the most in these 
debates. The need for recognition from the side of both Ukrainians and Russians is “the 
most driving force behind nationalism movements” (Taylor, 1994). However, as two cases 
from the Donbas and the Crimea show, it is quite hard to define Russians in Ukraine as 
one single group and in each of the regions Russians and Russian-speakers develop its 
own specificity. Paradoxically, “Russophone” Ukrainians are both the majority and minor-
ity. They form a dominant group when it comes to knowledge of Russian, its everyday 
use, the presence in mass media and so on but, on the other—they are in a minority when 
we talk about their bilingualism and thus “hidden” status in most of the sociological polls. 
In this regard, it serves no analytical purposes to try to define them as a diaspora, an inter-
est group, or even a minority. More interesting are the tendencies of its development. Will 
Russian-speakers in Ukraine try to sharpen their boundaries and separate from others? Are 
there any chances for their political-territorial autonomy based on any kind of the cultural 
distinctiveness? As I claim throughout the paper, there are no visible evidences for such 
efforts at the moment. However, the so-called “Euromaidan” revolution, the presence of 
Russian forces in Crimea and finally mass pro-Russian protests in the Donbas region may 
give a future groundwork for such a national project of the Russophones in Ukraine. Thus, 
an open question is whether the Russian-speakers will remain, as Ronald Suny (1993) sug-
gests, only a “cosmopolitan identity” living between Moscow and Kiev without any kind 
of claims, or perhaps they will develop a national consciousness.
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